57 pages • 1 hour read
An Army at Dawn
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Themes
The North African Campaign as America's Coming-of-Age
Near the beginning of the book, Atkinson argues that popular discussions around World War II tend to emphasize the Allies' 1944 invasion of Normandy Beach at the expense of the North African campaign of 1942 and 1943. This, Atkinson argues, is unfortunate: "No twenty-first-century reader can understand the ultimate triumph of the Allied powers in World War II in 1945 without a grasp of the large drama that unfolded in North Africa in 1942 and 1943" (2). Not only does Atkinson consider North Africa an inflection point in the broader war effort, he also considers it "a pivot point in American history, the place where the United States began to act like a great power—militarily, diplomatically, strategically, tactically" (3). He adds that the North African campaign "is where Great Britain slipped into the role of junior partner in the Anglo-American alliance, and where the United States first emerged as the dominant force it would remain into the next millennium" (3).
His thesis is supported by Great Britain’s and the United States' respective experiences during World War I. By the time of World War II, he argues, the United States had yet to be tested—militarily, industrially, nor diplomatically—in the era of modern war. To be sure, American intervention in World War I was crucial to the Allies' victory. However, it was Great Britain that played the dominant role in that conflict among Western powers. Over the course of four years, Great Britain deployed 6 million troops, 700,000 of whom died. In contrast, the United States' status as a combatant in World War I lasted less than two years. Of the 110,000 deaths America suffered, almost half of them came as a result of the Spanish Influenza. One of the most striking statistics cited by Atkinson is that in September 1939, when Hitler invaded Poland, the US Army ranked only "seventeenth in the world in size and combat power, just behind Romania" (8). By the end of the North African campaign, the United States was on course to become the largest military and industrial power in the world.
Beyond military matters, the North African campaign was also a learning experience from a diplomatic standpoint. In Casablanca, Atkinson states, severe US diplomatic weaknesses were exposed. By failing in their efforts to extract key concessions from the British at Casablanca, Atkinson argues that the Americans received an immensely valuable view of their own diplomatic weaknesses—weaknesses they addressed and corrected in the future: “Yes, the Yanks had been outgeneraled, and their shortcomings as strategic planners revealed—to none more clearly than themselves" (299), Atkinson writes. However, the diplomatic failure at Casablanca—like so many other failures in the book—paved the way for future success. Atkinson writes, "The British would never impose their will so easily again. Casablanca, like the African campaign as a whole, was part of the American coming of age, a hinge on which world history would swing for the next half century" (299).
Militarily and diplomatically, the North African campaign was an opportunity for the United States to grow into a global superpower. However, it was also an opportunity for America to flex its industrial prowess after a century of British dominance. Atkinson points out, "'The American Army does not solve its problems' one general noted, 'it overwhelms them.' There was prodigal in economy—of time, of motion, of stuff—but beyond the extravagance lay a brisk ability to get the job done" (415). In the book's Epilogue, Atkinson argues that the North African campaign served as a prelude, setting into motion dynamics that would continue throughout the war and beyond. He writes, "The United States was dominant now, by virtue of power and heft, with consequences that would extend not only beyond the war but beyond the century" (538).
How the Egos and Temperament of Individual Leaders Affect the Course of the War
Throughout the book, Atkinson takes note of the significant impact of decisions made by lone individuals, many of which were shaped by a person's ego, instinct, or temperament. Of particular note is President Roosevelt's decision to countermand his top generals and military advisors in opting to invade North Africa rather than launch a full-scale assault on Berlin through Northern Europe. Atkinson writes, "The president had made the most profound American strategic decision of the European war in direct contravention of his generals and admirals […] And he had based his fiat on instinct" (16).
Aside from instinct, a commander's temperament was also a key factor in shaping events during the North African campaign. For example, Atkinson argues that Eisenhower's congenial and humble demeanor were a calculation and leadership tactic. Again, it is worth revisiting war correspondent Don Whitehead's quote that Eisenhower was "a man who shaped events with such subtlety that he left others thinking they were the architects of those events. And he was satisfied to leave it that way" (60). From Eisenhower's example, Atkinson shows that the temperament and personality of individual actors—much like their instincts and egos—played a massive role in the course of human events on a global scale.
However, no leader's decisions were more affected by ego than Hitler's. When Rommel was relieved of his command, he was largely a victim of Hitler's arrogance, reflecting once again how individual egos can overpower strategic and tactical arguments. Upon rejecting Rommel's urgent plea to shrink the bridgehead around Tunis and Bizerte, Hitler told him, "If the German people are incapable of winning the war, then they can rot" (416). Hitler's certainty of his own tactical prowess grew so immense that it blocked out truth altogether: "'Hitler wanted to be stronger than mere facts, to bend them to his will,' Kesselring's chief of staff observed. 'All attempts to make him see reason only sent him into a rage'" (416). The chief of staff's conclusion supports the argument that Hitler's personal narcissism plays a significant role in the Axis' demise.
Finally, Atkinson singles out Montgomery as a victim of personal narcissism, particularly with respect to the general's slow pace in pursuing Rommel. Atkinson writes, "'Once Monty had his reputation,' charged the British air marshal Arthur Coningham, 'he would never risk it again'" (420). This lack of urgency with which General Montgomery's Eighth Army pursued Rommel after the Battle of El Alamein had enormous consequences for the Allied troops in North Africa. Had Montgomery continued to engage with Rommel as he fled across Libya, Atkinson argues, the costly February 14 offensive might have been avoided. Given Montgomery's reluctance to fight a battle he wasn't certain he could win, this sequence of events supports the theme that individual men's egos play an outsized role in shaping the course of the war.
How Morale Is Built Through Hatred
In the early parts of the campaign, a low level of morale infected the entire Allied apparatus, from commanders to officers to enlisted men. Ironically, Atkinson frames this low morale like so much else in the narrative: a necessary prelude to future success. Of the Allied troops around the midpoint of the campaign, Atkinson writes, "True, they did not hate yet; but they were developing the capacity of hatred which required a nihilistic core of resignation and rage" (262).
Here, Atkinson identifies the irony that low morale, at least at a certain stage of a war, can boost an army's chances of victory. Defeating an enemy, by Atkinson's calculation, requires a measure of hatred that can only be achieved by suffering heavy losses. The idea of morale becomes extremely nuanced. While the disadvantages of low morale are clear and obvious, such a condition can also provide a breeding ground for the “nihilistic core of resignation” (262) required to destroy an enemy force.
The potential for morale to grow after a stinging defeat is explored thoroughly in the wake of the Kasserine Pass fiasco. Most important among Atkinson's takeaways from this battle was the realization among Allied troops that Rommel, while formidable, was not invincible: “Amazingly," Atkinson writes, "barely two months would elapse between the 'hangheadness' of Kasserine and the triumph of total victory in Tunisia" (392). Beyond reflecting Atkinson's attitude toward failure, the quote explores the nuanced calculus of military morale. Until that point, the Allied armies in Tunisia exhibited either too much confidence or not enough. Coming out of Operation TORCH, the Allies severely underestimated the effectiveness and the ferocity of the German army. After the humiliation of repeated defeats at the hands of Rommel and Arnim, morale swung in the opposite direction. It was only after notching a legitimate win against Rommel that the Allies truly began to earn the right to high morale.
By the end of campaign, the terrible loss of life had a galvanizing effect on both Eisenhower and the rest of the American army, as they learned to spite the enemy with the kind of hatred needed to defeat it: “Most Yanks," Atkinson points out, "arrived in Morocco and Algeria convinced that they were fighting someone else's war; now they were fully vested, with a stake of their own" (538).
The Importance of Logistics in War
As the book progresses, it becomes clear that logistics—the practice of making sure troops are properly supplied and where they need to be—is at least as important to military operations as tactics. The website for the Smithsonian Institute quotes the old military saying, "Amateurs study tactics, but professionals study logistics." ("West Point in the Making of America." The Smithsonian Institute.). This axiom is supported by the experience of the Allies in North Africa. The army fell victim to faulty tanks and the fact that tons of weapons and ammunition languished in Casablanca. Moreover, the scenario of Allied troops awaiting reinforcements that never arrived plays out repeatedly. In turn, reinforcements often arrived to the field of engagement only to find that an offensive had already been cancelled.
Especially early on in the campaign, the Allies were plagued by logistical nightmares—most egregiously, the tanks left behind "after they proved a couple inches too big for the bow openings on the only landing ships available" (53). As the war progressed, Eisenhower worked hard to ensure that Allied forces in North Africa had the materiel they needed when they needed it, an astonishing logistical feat. In commenting on the importance of logistics in an army's success, Atkinson quotes Rommel: "The battle is fought and decided by the quartermasters before the shooting begins" (413). Atkinson cannot overstate the importance of the dramatic improvement in logistics the Americans experienced over the course of the North African campaign. It served as a boon to the American war effort overall and, more specifically, to troop morale.
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